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MERGER SIMULATION IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
This article addresses the application of the existing technical economic
literature on merger simulation in the practical context of merger review and
enforcement under the antitrust laws. It highlights the use of simple simula-
tions as a basis for creating screens and presumptions to aid senior enforce-
ment officials and judges, who may not have specialized in competition
policy, and to provide guidance to merging firms.
Economists increasingly analyze proposed mergers through the lens of
merger simulation. Comprehensive simulations attempt to incorporate a wide
range of available information in a fully specified economic model, while
simple simulations are based upon a limited number of parameters and vari-
ables. Simulation models have been relied upon by the antitrust agencies in
multiple jurisdictions and by expert economists testifying in merger litiga-
tion.1 They are also the subject of a growing academic literature.2
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The goal of merger simulation varies with the context. In an academic set-
ting, the object is to obtain the best prediction possible. Although researchers
do not ordinarily specify formally the criterion by which a prediction should
be judged,3 and do not routinely test predictions against outcomes,4 the focus
of simulation in an academic context is on improving its precision.
Additional considerations beyond precision come into play when proposed
mergers are analyzed in a setting in which administrability and implementa-
tion are important, which, for purposes of this discussion, I call an administra-
tive setting and include both antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts. In
this context, merger analysts must explain their conclusions to senior agency
officials and perhaps a district court judge, many of whom may not be special-
ists in competition law and economics. Moreover, in the administrative con-
text, it is important to provide guidance to firms trying to understand the
likely outcome of agency review so they can determine in advance the anti-
trust risks of the mergers and acquisitions they are considering.5
This article focuses on how merger simulation can and should be applied to
address proposed mergers in the context of antitrust enforcement, not on pro-
viding a technical survey of the literature on merger simulation.6 In particular,
it argues that simple simulations of both unilateral and coordinated effects of
horizontal mergers, incorporated as screens or to create presumptions, should
be relied upon in the early stages of the administrative review process and in
litigation to aid non-specialist decisionmakers in understanding the likely
competitive effects of mergers and provide guidance to merging firms.7 This
role for simple simulations is consistent with the direction in which the U.S.
horizontal merger guidelines are evolving.
3 One possibility is to minimize the mean absolute value or mean square of the forecast
errors. If the costs of false positives and false negatives are thought to differ, the appropriate loss
function would instead be asymmetric.
4 Testing is only possible when the merger is allowed to proceed. Cf. Dennis W. Carlton, Why
We Need to Measure the Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. w14719, Feb. 2009) (premerger and postmerger data are required
to measure the effectiveness of merger policy, along with enforcement agency predictions about
the postmerger market).
5 Although this article focuses on the way these issues appear in the U.S. administrative
context, in connection with both unilateral and coordinated effects, similar issues arise in other
jurisdictions.
6 In this respect, its ambition is similar to that of Derek Bok’s influential 1960 article on
merger policy. Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Econom-
ics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960). See generally, Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek Bok and the
Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515 (1988).
7 A simple simulation can be thought of as an approximation to a comprehensive simulation.
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I. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES IN
HORIZONTAL MERGER REVIEW
The merger review problems discussed here arise because it can be difficult
to provide appropriate guidance to non-specialist decisionmakers in the en-
forcement agencies and at the merging firms. These difficulties appear in a
litigation dilemma involving market definition that is characteristic of unilat-
eral effects enforcement in the United States.8 They also appear in a disjunc-
tion between the historical reliance on market concentration and market shares
for merger decisionmaking in the United States and the limited economic rele-
vance of these statistics for demonstrating both unilateral and coordinated
effects.
A. THE LITIGATION DILEMMA IN UNILATERAL EFFECTS ENFORCEMENT
Unilateral effects have been treated more skeptically by the courts in the
United States than by the antitrust enforcement agencies.9 The Federal Trade
Commission prevailed in its high-profile 1997 challenge to Staples’s proposed
acquisition of Office Depot, but the case was not framed by the court as a
unilateral effects matter.10 In 2004, a district court declined to enjoin Oracle’s
acquisition of PeopleSoft and, in doing so, set forth a legal standard which, if
followed in the future, would make unilateral effects very difficult to prove.11
8 In practice, unilateral effects most commonly arise from mergers among firms that sell
differentiated products without binding capacity constraints. This article follows both the legal
literature and the economic literature by focusing on this setting. Unilateral effects also arise in
other settings, including markets in which prices are set by bargaining or auctions and markets
with relatively homogeneous goods in which firms compete by choosing production levels or
capacities. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§§ 6.2–6.3 (2010) [hereinafter Guidelines], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.
pdf. Simulation methods appropriate for analyzing unilateral effects in various settings other than
the differentiated products markets considered here are discussed in Werden & Froeb, supra
note 1.
9 For discussion of the enforcement agencies’ treatment of unilateral effects, see Jonathan B.
Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects? 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31
(2003). The discussion of unilateral effects in this article emphasizes the most common setting,
of mergers between sellers of differentiated products.
10 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). Staples is commonly and properly
understood as a unilateral effects case, but it was described by the court as a merger to monopoly
in a narrowly defined product market (or submarket) in a number of metropolitan areas. The
court adopted the product market proposed by the government: consumable office supplies sold
through office superstores. See generally Jonathan B. Baker & Robert Pitofsky, A Turning Point
in Merger Enforcement: Federal Trade Commission v. Staples, in ANTITRUST STORIES 311 (Elea-
nor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (legal discussion of the case). Cf. Jonathan B. Baker,
Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 203,
210 n.30 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, Stepping Out] (collecting examples of submarkets that may
have been defined narrowly to capture localized competition, obviating the need for unilateral
effects analysis).
11 The court held that the Justice Department was required to show that the transaction would
create a monopoly or near-monopoly but had failed to prove the narrowly defined product mar-
454 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77
More recently, in Whole Foods, a district court denied the Federal Trade
Commission’s request that it enjoin preliminarily a proposed merger based
upon a unilateral effects theory, although that decision was reversed and re-
manded on appeal.12
These enforcement difficulties arise in part because the government faces a
litigation dilemma in unilateral effects cases. To illustrate the problem, sup-
pose, counterfactually, that during the late 1970s, Anheuser-Busch (Bud), the
brewing company that owned Budweiser, sought to acquire another national
brewer, Pabst.13 Bud was the market leader, accounting for about one-fourth
of the beer sold in the United States, and the three leading firms—Bud,
Miller, and Schiltz—together controlled about 55 percent of U.S. sales. Three
other national firms—Pabst, Coors, and Stroh—each had national shares be-
tween 5 percent and 15 percent (though greater shares in certain regions of the
country).14
Beer is a differentiated product,15 and unilateral effects would have been a
plausible competitive effects theory were it not anachronistic to suppose that a
modern unilateral effects analysis would have been advanced in litigation at
that time. An econometric study found that Pabst constrained Bud’s pricing
ket it alleged (high-function software used for financial management systems and human rela-
tions management). The decision also questioned whether narrow markets could ever be defined
in a principled way. It emphasized the difficulty of identifying clear breaks in the chain of substi-
tutes and the danger that submarket analysis would improperly identify narrow groupings as
markets based on inappropriate non-economic criteria. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). See generally Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigo-
rating Horizontal Merger Enforcement 235, 241–44, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT
THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert
Pitofsky ed., 2008) (highlighting ways in which the Oracle decision sought to limit the ability of
courts to find adverse unilateral effects).
12 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007), rev’d, 533 F.3d 869
(D.C. Cir. 2008) and 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The appeals court concluded that the
district court had improperly discounted some of the market definition evidence on the govern-
ment’s side of the argument. The FTC had alleged that premium natural and organic supermar-
kets constituted a relevant product market appropriate to analyzing the competitive effects of the
transaction.
13 Facts about the industry are set forth in Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Esti-
mating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm 6 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988);
Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-
Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985) [hereinafter Gains from Merger]. See
also Baker, Stepping Out, supra note 10, at 215 (discussing a similar counterfactual).
14 The U.S. brewing industry has grown more concentrated since that time, perhaps reflecting
the consequences for market structure of endogenous sunk expenditures on national advertising.
See generally JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE (1991). Multistate regions
were likely geographic markets for U.S. brewing during the late 1970s. See Christian Schmidt
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding challenge
to brewing industry merger within a twelve-state upper Midwest geographic market).
15 Differentiation among the leading U.S. brands at the time was based on non-physical prod-
uct attributes, not taste.
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and a simple simulation analysis based upon that study predicted that the post-
merger price of Bud would increase by at least 10 percent.16 The litigation
problem facing the government in challenging a merger based upon a unilat-
eral effects theory can be illustrated by supposing that the government, con-
vinced by this economic study, sought to challenge the transaction in court.
The government might have attempted to prove its case by showing that the
merger would create a dominant firm within a narrowly defined product mar-
ket: a market or submarket that included both Bud and Pabst. But it is hard to
imagine a court defining a Bud/Pabst submarket while excluding from the
market other large national firms, particularly Miller and Schlitz. Such a sub-
market would have looked like result-oriented gerrymandering that arbitrarily
excluded some competing products to make the postmerger market share ap-
pear high.17 Yet most litigators (today and undoubtedly also then) think it
would be even more difficult for the government to prevail by showing harm
to competition from unilateral effects within a broad product market—here,
all beer—in which the merging firms have several rivals, even if the govern-
ment could introduce a simulation study demonstrating the likelihood of a
substantial price rise based upon econometric estimates of demand elastici-
ties.18 However difficult the task of proving unilateral effects of the hypotheti-
cal merger within a broad product market, moreover, it would become
virtually impossible under the legal standard adopted by the district court in
Oracle, which requires the government to show a merger to near-monopoly.19
The litigation dilemma may appear idiosyncratic to the U.S. antitrust en-
forcement system, but it makes a point of general applicability. Non-specialist
decisionmakers do not automatically focus their attention on the key issue at
stake in unilateral effects: whether, given the nature of buyer substitution pat-
terns, either merging firm constrained its merger partner’s ability to raise price
prior to the transaction (notwithstanding the presence or absence of the addi-
tional constraints posed by the possibility of buyer substitution to other firms).
16 Baker & Bresnahan, Gains from Merger, supra note 13.
17 In the hypothetical brewing industry example, this problem would have been especially
acute if the government had also alleged that the merger would have generated adverse coordi-
nated effects within an “all beer” product market. More generally, the government would be
expected to have the greatest difficulty defending market boundaries when challenging mergers
in industries where products differ on narrow characteristics (perhaps as with shampoo or soft
drinks) or where firms sell their products at multiple locations near each other (perhaps as with
convenience stores, coffee shops, or banks).
18 See, e.g., Daniel M. Wall, FTC Unilateral Effects Analysis and Litigation Workshop: Panel
on the Role of Market Definition 97, 100–01 (Feb. 12, 2008) (transcript), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/transcript.pdf.
19 This legal standard makes no economic sense. A dominant position is not required for the
exercise of market power in a differentiated product setting, and low market shares do not neces-
sarily make unilateral effects unlikely (for example, because competition may be localized). See
generally Baker & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 243.
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In the context of litigation, defendants exploit the process of market defini-
tion—regardless of whether the government seeks to define a broad market or
a narrow one—to emphasize rivalry from third firms and downplay the com-
petitive constraint either merging firm poses for its partner.20 If the govern-
ment defines a broad market, defendants make that point by highlighting the
possibility that buyers would substitute to market participants beyond the
merging firms. If the government defines a narrow market, defendants ques-
tion whether the market has been gerrymandered to downplay those substitu-
tion possibilities. But this defense effort can mislead a non-specialist
decisionmaker because rivalry from third firms does not matter in unilateral
effects analysis for its own sake; it is only relevant to the extent that buyer
substitution to those firms provides a competitive constraint that duplicates
the constraint that the merging firms provide for each other.
The U.S. litigation dilemma thus makes evident a difficulty with proving
unilateral effects likely to arise in any enforcement system: the problem of
ensuring that the system leads non-specialist decisionmakers to evaluate the
competitive constraint the merging firms pose for each other prior to their
merger, given the nature of buyer demand. The litigation dilemma can be
understood as a problem of inadequate guidance. It arises to the extent that the
decisionmaking rules for the U.S. courts do not lead judges to focus attention
on key questions and do not induce litigants to bring forward the most proba-
tive evidence for answering them.
B. LEGAL RULES BASED ON MARKET CONCENTRATION
The guidance problem in the U.S. system goes beyond the unilateral effects
litigation dilemma because legal rules that emphasize market concentration
and market share also provide inadequate guidance to the courts and the merg-
ing firms.21 Merger review in U.S. courts is based on the “structural presump-
tion” of harm arising from high and increasing market concentration.22 Yet
rules based on market shares and market concentration provide poor guidance
for analyzing mergers, whether the competitive effects theory involves unilat-
eral or coordinated effects.
20 See Jonathan B. Baker, FTC Unilateral Effects Analysis and Litigation Workshop: Panel on
the Role of Market Definition 97, 108–09 (Feb. 12, 2008) (transcript), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/bc/unilateral/transcript.pdf.
21 For a recent effort to describe the appropriate relevance of market concentration in merger
analysis, highlighting factual settings in which market shares and market concentration have
probative value, see Jonathan B. Baker, Market Concentration in the Antitrust Analysis of Hori-
zontal Mergers, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 234 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010)
[Market Concentration] (corrected in a working paper available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1092248).
22 See generally Baker & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 236–38.
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Market shares, from which concentration statistics like the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) are derived, do not convey much information about
buyer substitution, the key economic issue in unilateral effects cases. Shares
do not measure the extent to which buyers view the products of the merging
firms as close substitutes. More precisely, market shares measure buyers’ first
choices, while unilateral effects instead turn on buyers’ second choices—on
where customers would go if the price were to rise on the product they previ-
ously preferred.23 Accordingly, an enforcement system that places heavy
weight on market shares will likely perform poorly in evaluating unilateral
effects.
The structural presumption is more important in the analysis of coordinated
effects than for unilateral effects, but market concentration again provides
only limited guidance as to the likely harm from a merger. The problem arises
from the nature of the theory underlying the application of the structural pre-
sumption to coordinated effects. That theory can be described as a “dinner
party story”: If more people are invited to dinner, it becomes more difficult to
coordinate calendars and less likely that others will notice if someone who
accepted the invitation does not show (cheats). The dinner party story is es-
sentially an empirical generalization that recognizes that the odds of coordina-
tion rise as market concentration increases.
Yet the underlying empirical support for a relationship between concentra-
tion and price, while present, is not strong.24 Moreover, the dinner party story
does not describe the mechanism at work. It does not explain why a particular
increase in concentration through merger will help coordinating firms solve
their “cartel problems” of reaching consensus on the terms of coordination or
deterring cheating. Instead it is a probabilistic statement based on a rough
empirical regularity that suggests that enforcers and courts should be con-
cerned with every non-trivial merger in a concentrated market.25
The strength of the structural presumption applied by U.S. courts has
eroded greatly since the presumption was established during the 1960s.26 The
23 Although the process of market definition, from which market shares are generated, incor-
porates information about buyer second choices, and one theoretical model (logit demand) relates
buyer first choices and second choices, there is little empirical basis in general for making such a
connection.
24 There is no well-established “critical” concentration level beyond which the risk of coordi-
nation rises markedly, and firm-specific and industry-specific factors beyond concentration are
also important in determining prices. See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC &
JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 505–06 (2d ed. 2008) (Sidebar 5–6).
25 Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive
Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 139 (2002) [hereinafter Mavericks].
26 Baker & Shapiro, supra note 11, at 236–38. In United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., the D.C.
Circuit described market concentration as simply “a convenient starting point” for a “totality-of-
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erosion of the structural presumption has, on the whole, been beneficial, given
the limited value of market concentration measures for evaluating both unilat-
eral and coordinated competitive effects. But that benefit comes at the cost of
making litigation less predictable, thereby reducing the guidance that legal
rules provide to both non-specialist decisionmakers and merging firms.27
II. MERGER SIMULATION AS A SOLUTION
The remainder of this article considers how merger simulation can help
solve these enforcement problems in evaluating unilateral and coordinated ef-
fects in assessing proposed mergers in an administrative setting. It shows how
screens and presumptions based upon simple simulations can help the govern-
ment win good unilateral effects cases in court, provide guidance to merging
firms, and explain why (not just whether) particular mergers make harm to
competition likely. Simple simulations would supplement comprehensive sim-
ulations, which would remain important in detailed agency review and in
litigation.
A. UNILATERAL EFFECTS
Whether simulations are simple or comprehensive, they are based on the
same underlying economic theory, which can quickly be sketched. Suppose
that each firm in a differentiated consumer product industry sells a single
product (ruling out multi-product producers). The firms have constant margi-
nal costs that may differ. The premerger price for a particular firm, firm 1, is
set at the level at which the firm is indifferent to a small change.
(1) DP1Q1 = (P1 − C1) DQ1
Equation (1) is the first order condition for profit maximization by firm 1
written in differential form. The left-hand expression is the benefit from a
small increase in price (greater revenues DP1 on each of the Q1 units sold); the
right-hand expression represents the cost (the forgone price-cost margin (P1 −
C1) times the DQ1 sales lost by raising price).
A merger of this firm with firm 2 provides the merged firm with an incen-
tive to raise the price of the first product.
(2) DP1Q1 + (P2 − C2) DQ2 > (P1 − C1) DQ1
the-circumstances” analysis. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir.
1990). But cf. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (merging firms did not
successfully rebut the presumption of harm to competition in a merger to duopoly with evidence
that the efficiencies from merger would allow the merged firm to compete more effectively
against the dominant firm in the market).
27 Oracle arguably would provide a great deal of guidance by circumscribing the govern-
ment’s ability to win in court, but this “solution” to the problem is obviously unsatisfactory.
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The new term in equation (2), (P2 − C2) DQ2, represents the gain to the merged
firm from internalizing the benefit a higher price charged by the first firm
confers on the profitability of the second firm, by virtue of the fact that some
of the lost sales on firm 1’s product shift to the product produced by firm 2.28
For similar reasons, the transaction also provides the merged firm with an
incentive to increase the price of the second product. The merged firm
chooses the price of each product simultaneously to optimize total profits,
taking into account the feedbacks that result from raising the price of each. It
is likely that it will increase the price of both products.
There are several ways of understanding intuitively why the merger leads to
an increase in the price for the first product.29 One is the “profit recapture”
idea emphasized above: The merger allows firm 1 to recapture some of the
profit margin it previously lost to firm 2. Another, an “opportunity cost” intui-
tion, is based on the idea that after the merger, the firm recognizes that ex-
panding output of the first product would cannibalize sales from the second
product, which it now owns. Accordingly, the merger raises the opportunity
cost of selling the first product, leading it to reduce output of that product and
raise price.30 A third intuition emphasizes the way the merger “removes a
competitive constraint.” Prior to the merger, the products of multiple firms,
firm 2 included, constrain firm 1 from raising price. The merger removes one
of these constraints, thereby making the residual demand for the first product
less elastic and providing the merged firm with an incentive to raise that prod-
uct’s price.31
These intuitions can be captured in both comprehensive and simple simula-
tions. A comprehensive merger simulation works out the postmerger equilib-
rium prices and output for both products, accounting for a wide range of
potentially relevant information. For example, in the setting above, if n firms
selling the differentiated product can reasonably be assumed to interact in
accordance with a Bertrand-Nash oligopoly solution concept, the premerger
first-order condition for each firm i can be written as in equation (3), where Li
= (Pi – Ci)/Pi is the Lerner Index for product i and eii is own price elasticity of
demand for that product.
28 The expression DQ2/ DQ1 is termed a “diversion ratio.”
29 For a more extensive discussion, see Baker & Reitman, supra note 2. Unilateral effects
could also arise if the merger allowed the new firm to increase the marginal costs of rivals
through exclusionary conduct, but this possibility is ignored in the class of simulation models
discussed here.
30 This perspective is emphasized in Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through,
and Market Definition, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (2010). See also E. Glen Weyl & Michal Fab-
inger, Pass-Through as an Economic Tool 30–34 (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1324426.
31 This perspective is emphasized in Baker & Bresnahan, Gains from Merger, supra note 13.
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(3) Li = −1/eii, for i = 1. . . .n
The simultaneous solution of the n equation (3) determines the prices and
output for all producers.
In this model, the merger alters two of the n first order conditions, those
corresponding to firms 1 and 2 (the merger partners). The two modified post-
merger first-order conditions can be specified analytically,32 as indicated in
equations (4) and (5), where the eij terms are demand cross-elasticities.
(4) L1 = −1/e11 − L2(e12/e11)(Q2P2)/(Q1P1)
(5) L2 = −1/e22 − L1(e21/e22)(Q1P1)/(Q2P2)
The two new first-order conditions above, combined with the n – 2 first-order
conditions for the other products can then be solved simultaneously for the
postmerger equilibrium prices and outputs.
This is not the only approach possible for comprehensive simulation. Alter-
native approaches in the economic literature can be understood as relaxing or
modifying various assumptions in the above model,33 thereby making a differ-
ent tradeoff between tractability (which pushes toward reducing the number of
parameters) and flexibility (which pushes toward increasing them).34
The advantages of comprehensive simulation are independent of how the
key parameters are identified. In particular, econometrics is not required to
perform a merger simulation, even a comprehensive one. The demand func-
tions, oligopoly conduct, and marginal cost functions in the model could in-
deed be estimated econometrically. It is also possible to incorporate
qualitative information about these inputs and non-econometric quantitative
information, such as engineering studies of cost, and to combine such infor-
mation with econometric estimates.
The potential advantages of comprehensive simulation instead largely relate
to increased precision in evaluating unilateral effects given the best informa-
tion available about the key model inputs. A comprehensive simulation syn-
thesizes a great deal of information (in the example above, about demand
elasticities and margins) in a logically consistent way. It may provide a metric
for understanding what key parameters mean for the merged firm’s incentive
32 In the simple model in the text, if marginal costs are constant and the oligopoly solution
concept known, information on the premerger demand parameters (own and cross elasticities, or
their diversion ratio analogues) can be used to infer marginal cost, which need not be estimated
separately. The model can also incorporate information about marginal cost savings from
merger.
33 For surveys see Baker & Reitman, supra note 2; Werden & Froeb, supra note 1.
34 This tradeoff is emphasized in Baker & Reitman, supra note 2.
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to raise price and can be used to identify critical uncertainties in model speci-
fication and parameter estimates.
It may be possible, moreover, to use a comprehensive simulation to identify
subtle unilateral effects in dense markets, for example when the products of
the merging firms are substitutes, but not the closest substitutes, premerger. A
comprehensive simulation can be used to improve predictions beyond what
can be inferred from buyer substitution, the first-order issue in the analysis of
unilateral effects among sellers of branded consumer products,35 by account-
ing for issues, including rival reactions and repositioning.36 Finally, it can be
difficult to assess the net effect of a merger between rivals that also confers
efficiencies without a model, which a comprehensive simulation may provide.
For all these reasons, a comprehensive simulation can be valuable when un-
dertaking a detailed assessment of an individual merger proposal, particularly
when the transaction is subject to detailed agency review (e.g., following a
second request) or litigation.
Yet comprehensive simulations also have features that are not well-
matched to the administrative context. They can be difficult and time-consum-
ing to develop. They are typically custom-designed for each merger to ac-
count for key features of the industry and the available information. They
routinely incorporate judgment calls that structure the analysis, often made
with an eye toward mathematical tractability.37 And the information demands
are high because the goal is to work out the implications of a discrete change
in key variables on price and output arising from merger, not simply to iden-
35 Buyer substitution is the key issue in evaluating unilateral effects in many common merger
settings, particularly mergers between sellers of branded consumer products, where the main
difficulty firms face in expanding output is in obtaining buyer acceptance (rising marginal cost of
marketing differentiated products) rather than in overcoming capacity constraints. Consistent
with this view, simulation models of unilateral effects involving branded consumer products
typically treat the marginal cost of production as constant.
36 See, e.g., Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from
the U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & ECON. 627 (2006) (simulation methods can improve predic-
tions by incorporating information about rival reactions); see generally Michael Doane, Luke
Froeb & Steven Tschantz, WARNING: Improper Use of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Can Result in Overly Narrow Markets, Mistaken Inferences of Market Power, and Wrong-
Headed Analyses, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Autumn 2010, Vol. 10, No. 2, at 1, 4 (simple models
can give misleading merger predictions if they do not account for repositioning, capacity con-
straints, vertical relationships, promotional competition, switching costs, and bargaining, bid-
ding, or quantity competition).
37 Relatedly, simulation models must be structured to ensure consistency among the assump-
tions made concerning marginal cost, oligopoly conduct, and demand. In the simple Bertrand
model set forth above, for example, the first-order conditions take the form L = 1/e. If the de-
mand elasticity and marginal cost are not consistent, and the underlying data (e.g., the measure of
price) are reliable, then an assumption as to at least one key factor (demand function, marginal
cost function, or Bertrand conduct) cannot be maintained.
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tify the direction of the change in price and output resulting from a small shift
in market structure.38
These features may be a poor fit for the administrative context, which often
demands rapid decisionmaking. For example, the enforcement agencies must
decide quickly whether they should request additional information to conduct
an in-depth analysis. The administrative context also places a premium on
guidance and accessibility. Put differently, in an administrative context, in-
creased precision is not the only goal.
By contrast, simple simulations to create screens or presumptions may be
particularly useful in the administrative context. One example of a simple
simulation, set forth in equation (6), is a formula derived by Carl Shapiro that
computes the percentage price increase for one product (product 1) after a
merger between two single product sellers.39 The formula assumes linear de-
mand, constant marginal cost, and Bertrand conduct.40
(6) DP1/P1 ≥ (1/2)d12[(P2 − C2)/P1]
An analogous formula would apply to predict the percentage price increase
for the second product.41
Equation (6) employs simple algebra and only four variables or parameters:
one diversion ratio (d12), from the first product to the second;42 two premerger
prices; and one marginal cost, for the second product. Through the diversion
ratio, it accounts for buyer substitution, the key economic force at issue in
38 For example, the postmerger outcome could require out-of-sample predictions about
demand.
39 Carl Shapiro, Unilateral Effects Calculations 8 (Oct. 2010), available at http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/shapiro/unilateral.pdf; see also Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products,
ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 23.
40 Shapiro writes the formula as DP1/P1 ≥ (1/2)d12[(P2 − C2)/P2](P2/P1) to define [(P2 − C2)/P2]
as a price-cost margin. Cancellation of the P2 terms in the right-hand expression gives the expres-
sion (6).
41 Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro propose an upward pricing pressure (UPP) index that is a
variant of this formula: d12(P2−C2) ≥ EC1. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro Antitrust Evaluation of
Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. THEORETICAL
ECON.: POLICIES & PERSPECTIVES, vol. 10, issue 1, art. 9 (2010), http://www.bepress.com/bejte/
vol10/iss1/art9. The left-hand side of this inequality represents the expected recaptured profit per
switching customer if the merged firm increases the price of the first product a small amount.
This profit increase is calibrated by requiring that it equal or exceed an arbitrary percentage E of
the first product’s premerger marginal cost. A related price pressure index was previously pro-
posed in Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Finan-
ical Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000).
42 The diversion ratio d12 is defined as the percentage of unit sales lost by the first product
resulting from a price increase that is captured by the second product. Diversion ratios are related
to demand elasticities. For example, d12 = [e12/−e22)][Q1/Q2], where e12 is the cross elasticity of
demand from product 1 to product 2, e22 is the own elasticity of demand for product 2, and the Qs
are quantities for the two products.
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unilateral effects in branded consumer product settings. It is not too simplistic:
it does not assume symmetry in prices, marginal costs, or diversion ratios. But
it makes assumptions about what are usually less fundamental features of the
analysis in such settings: how marginal cost varies with output, third-firm
responses, and efficiencies from merger. Because equation (6) incorporates
the most important information relevant to assessing unilateral effects, and
integrates that information in a manner consistent with the underlying eco-
nomic theory, it provides a plausible basis for developing a screen or pre-
sumption about the unilateral competitive effects of merger.
One way to understand the formula (6) is to recognize that the expression
[d12(P2 − C2)] represents the expected recaptured profit per switching customer
if the merged firm increases the price of the first product by a small amount.43
The greater that recaptured profit, the greater the incentive of the merged firm
to raise the price of the first product.
Another interpretation arises from recognizing the close relationship be-
tween the right-hand expression in equation (6) and the gross upward pricing
pressure index (GUPPI) adopted in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.44
The GUPPI for product 1 (denoted GUPPI1) is defined as GUPPI1 = d12[(P2 −
C2)/P1]. The GUPPI is interpreted in the Guidelines as the value of sales of the
first product diverted to the second by virtue of a small price increase in the
first, divided by the total revenues lost by the first product as a result of the
price increase.45 It is in effect a diversion ratio expressed in revenue terms and
would fall in a range between 0 and 100 percent. Substitution of the definition
of the GUPPI for firm 1 into equation (6) yields equation (7).
(7) DP1/P1 = (1/2)GUPPI1
43 Here the diversion ratio is interpreted as the probability that a customer of firm 1’s product
would switch to the second firm’s product in response to a price increase for the first product.
44 See Guidelines, supra note 8, § 6.1 & n.11. The Guidelines do not use the specific term
GUPPI, however.
45 If DQ1 is the unit quantity lost by firm 1 in response to a small price increase, then
DQ1d12(P2 − C2) represents the value of lost sales of the first product that were diverted, while
DQ1P1 represents the total lost revenues on the first product. Their ratio is the GUPPI. For deriva-
tions and more detailed discussion, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701 (2010); Steven C. Salop, Serge
X. Moresi & John R. Woodbury, Scoring Unilateral Effects with the GUPPI: The Approach of
the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, CRA COMPETITION MEMO (Aug. 31, 2010) , available at
http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/Commentary-on-the-GUPPI.pdf. See also Serge
Moresi, The Use of Upward Price Pressure Indices in Merger Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Feb. 2010, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_
Moresi2_25f.authcheckdam.pdf. The information used to derive the GUPPI (prices, costs, and
diversion ratios) could also be combined to simulate price increases in other ways, but at the loss
of the accessibility advantages that make the GUPPI approach an appealing basis for guidance in
an administrative context. See Jerry Hausman, Serge Moresi & Mark Rainey, Unilateral Effects
of Mergers with General Linear Demand, 111 ECON. LETTERS 119 (2011).
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Equation (7) indicates that under the assumptions implicit in equation (6), a
merger between the firms would increase the price of the first firm’s product
by half the first firm’s GUPPI.46
If equation (7) were viewed as a comprehensive simulation, it would be
woefully inadequate. It presumes single product firms, linear demand, con-
stant marginal cost, Bertrand conduct, no efficiencies from merger, and no
rival responses including price changes, entry, or repositioning. It also as-
sumes that the merged firm raises only the price of one merger partner’s prod-
uct, not both.47 In practice, evidence can generally be brought to bear to test or
modify many of these assumptions, and that information would be incorpo-
rated into a comprehensive simulation, yet equation (7) ignores such evidence.
For this reason, commentary on the use of the GUPPI in the Guidelines de-
scribes it as a “diagnostic measure” or “scoring” rather than as a tool for
generating a “prediction” of the postmerger price,48 and the Guidelines stop
short of computing the implied percentage price increase.
Equation (7) is better understood as a simple simulation. It has several vir-
tues that make it particularly useful in an administrative context: it can likely
be applied more rapidly, would be better anticipated by merging firms, and
would be more accessible to decisionmakers than any comprehensive simula-
tion. In consequence, a price increase implied by equation (7) could be used
by enforcers as a screen to identify mergers creating the potential for unilat-
eral effects and by courts as a basis for a presumption that a merger among
sellers of differentiated products would harm competition.49 Because a simple
46 Under the “opportunity cost” intuition, the merger raises the opportunity cost of selling the
first product. The division by two reflects the fact that a monopolist with a linear demand func-
tion and constant marginal cost passes through 50 percent of a cost change to its buyers. Differ-
ently shaped demand functions would generate different passthrough rates.
47 The comprehensive simulation model set forth in equations (1) through (5) differs most
importantly from the simple simulation specified by equation (7) because it accounts for feed-
back effects between the price change for the first product and other prices, including both the
price the merged firm charges for its other product and the prices that its non-merging rivals
charge.
48 Shapiro, supra note 45, at 97; Salop, Moresi & Woodbury, supra note 45; see Dennis W.
Carlton, Use and Misuse of Empirical Methods in the Economics of Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON., Spring 2011, Vol. 3, No. 1, at 1, 10 (describing UPP as “being suggested as a screen to
use in merger cases that is a short-cut to a full merger simulation”).
49 An alternative simple approach to merger simulation, relying on estimating partial residual
demand elasticities, is described in Baker & Bresnahan, Gains from Merger, supra note 13.
Michael Whinston provides a recent discussion of its limitations as a comprehensive simulation
approach, but does not address its value for creating a screen or presumption. MICHAEL D. WHIN-
STON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 105–10 (2006). Another alternative approach, com-
puting compensating marginal cost reductions (cost reductions that would be necessary to offset
the incentive of the merged firm to raise price), is closely related to the GUPPI (and was devel-
oped first). See generally Doane, Froeb & Tschantz, supra note 36, at 5–6; Gregory J. Werden, A
Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Prod-
ucts, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 (1996); Gregory J. Werden & Luke Froeb, Choosing Among Tools
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simulation like equation (7) limits the information that is employed in predict-
ing the postmerger price, price forecasts based upon it would likely lead to
greater error than those that would result from the use of a comprehensive
simulation.50 Some error can be tolerated in a simulation employed as a screen
or presumption, but it would be useful for researchers to examine case studies
exploring the direction and size of such errors before adopting any particular
simulation approach as a screen.51 Such information would also be useful in
setting a critical value for the GUPPI, above which the merger would be pre-
sumed to harm competition.52
If equation (7) is used as the basis for creating a presumption or screen,53 it
would give guidance to firms considering mergers as to whether their transac-
tion would draw scrutiny from enforcers or courts.54 Government reliance on
equation (7) would also help make clear the logic by which unilateral effects
harm competition, and encourage the courts to adopt a presumption based on
it, thereby addressing the litigation dilemma by helping the government win
good unilateral effects cases in court.
B. COORDINATED EFFECTS
Simulation methods for coordinated effects are less developed than those
used for unilateral effects. One possible comprehensive simulation approach,
roughly at the state of the art in the academic literature, would begin by speci-
for Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
180424.
50 A comprehensive simulation could perform less well than the corresponding simple simula-
tion in an individual case—for example, if the additional information it incorporates is noisy and
is particularly misleading—but comprehensive simulations are likely to perform better than sim-
ple simulations on average.
51 Simulation modeling might also provide insight as to the circumstances (functional form of
demand, extent of asymmetry between the merging firms, degree of substitution to non-merging
firms, etc.) under which the predictions from simple simulations are most similar to the predic-
tions from comprehensive simulations.
52 As an illustrative example, the threshold GUPPI might be set at 10 percent, consistent with
an implied price increase of 5 percent. This figure might tend to overestimate the actual magni-
tude of the price rise from a merger, given that it does not account for repositioning, entry, or
efficiencies. Or it might tend to underestimate the price rise, given that it does not account for
feedback effects. Studies evaluating the errors from using simple simulations rather than compre-
hensive ones could provide information about the distribution of these possible biases. Moreover,
the choice of threshold may also depend on administrative considerations (a higher threshold
reduces the number of investigations, lessening administrative costs) and policy considerations
(the social costs of failing to investigate harmful mergers that fall under the threshold compared
with the social costs of investigating mergers unlikely to harm competition that would not be
screened out).
53 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines do not incorporate equation (7) expressly, but they
represent an evolution in that direction.
54 If equation (7) is used for this purpose, it may be appropriate to set a benchmark or thresh-
old for concern for the percentage price increase.
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fying how the firms were interacting before the merger, perhaps as a non-
cooperative game or an imperfect coordinated interaction. Then the post-
merger cooperative equilibrium would be computed by making an (arbitrary)
assumption about how cooperation works—perhaps Nash bargaining to split
the surplus,55 a balanced temptation equilibrium,56 or the application of some
focal rule57—subject to the incentive constraint that no firm prefers cheating
to cooperation.
Other quantitative approaches for understanding coordinated effects in the
academic literature ask a related question: whether the merger relaxes a con-
straint limiting coordination. One such method looks at how the merger
changes the profitability of collusive agreements among all subsets of the
market participants.58 Another evaluates how the merger alters the incentive
constraint for each firm under the assumption that any deviation leads to a
permanent return to the non-cooperative outcome, to identify how the transac-
tion alters the minimum discount factor at which coordination is profitable.59
In theory, these methods could form the basis for creating a presumption or
screen to be applied in the administrative context, but that use is impractical in
practice as their computational demands are similar to those required for com-
prehensive simulation.
By contrast, a presumption that relies on the idea that a maverick constrains
more effective coordination may be simpler to employ and, thus, may be par-
ticularly useful in the administrative context.60 Mavericks arise because coor-
dination is typically imperfect and incomplete, falling short of obtaining the
55 Kai-Uwe Ku¨hn, The Coordinated Effects of Mergers, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECO-
NOMICS, supra note 1, at 105, 140.
56 Pierluigi Sabbatini, How to Simulate the Coordinated Effects of a Merger, 12 Autorita`
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Temi e Problemi (June 2006), available at www.agcm.
it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/2659-tp012.html.
57 For example, coordinating firms may reach a simple understanding by which they raise all
prices by the same percentage, grandfathering in prior differentials. Or they may pick a price
with the understanding that all firms would achieve it by reducing output by the same percentage
(and so preserve prior market shares). Focal rules are discussed in Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sher-
man Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Eco-
nomic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 162–69 (1993).
58 William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Steven P. Schulenberg, Coordi-
nated Effects in Merger Review: Quantifying the Payoffs from Collusion, in 2006 FORDHAM
COMPETITION L. INST. 271 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2007), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/
~marx/bio/papers/FordhamChapter%2013.pdf. This methodology could form a basis for creating
a presumption or screen if the likelihood of coordination is thought to be an increasing function
of those payoffs.
59 Peter Davis & Cristian Huse, Estimating the “Coordinated Effect” of Mergers (Jan. 2010),
available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/analysis/Peter%20Davis_
Cristian%20Huse_2010.pdf; Davis & Garce´s, supra note 2, at 426–34. Mergers that lower the
critical discount factor are thought to make coordination more likely.
60 See Baker, Market Concentration, supra note 21 (corrected working paper); Baker, Maver-
icks, supra note 25.
2011] MERGER SIMULATION IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT 467
fully collusive price. Coordination is generally limited for many reasons, in-
cluding these four: First, coordinating firms may be unable to commit to re-
sponding to cheating with steep punishments. For example, they may be able
to commit to return to a repeated non-cooperative stage game only. Second,
coordinating firms may be unable to make side payments to recalcitrant firms.
Third, the firms may find it necessary to rely on expensive strategies to deter
cheating when a noisy environment makes cheating difficult to detect, for
example, when firms engage in price wars in response to unexpected demand
shocks.61 Finally, the firms may find it difficult to identify the joint profit-
maximizing outcome without communicating, especially as the number of
products and markets involved increases. So instead of communicating, they
may find themselves relying on focal rules to determine the terms of coordina-
tion. When coordination is incomplete, as in general would be expected, it
would not be surprising to find that most firms are not indifferent between
coordination and cheating—preferring more effective coordination—while
some firms, the mavericks, are close to the line and thus constrain coordina-
tion from becoming more complete. When coordination takes place in oligop-
oly markets with differentiated firms, the firms are likely to differ in attributes
affecting costs and demand, so there is most likely only one maverick.
The role of a maverick in constraining coordination can be illustrated
through a simple model.62 The model assumes that sellers of homogeneous
products interact premerger in an infinitely repeated oligopoly supergame. In-
dustry demand can be written Q(P), for market price P. Marginal cost (Ci) and
capacity (ki) may differ across firms i. Under the terms of coordination, firms
reach consensus on price and firm shares (si). The discount rate, common to
all firms, is denoted δ, with 0 < δ < 1.
If cheating were to occur, the cheater would undercut the market price by a
tiny amount (epsilon), allowing it to sell its entire production capacity. Be-
cause the market price would not fall more than trivially with cheating, indus-
try output would remain unchanged. This state of affairs would continue for T
periods, after which the cartel would break down permanently and the firms
would earn zero profits.63
61 Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price
Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984).
62 The model is described in more detail in Baker, Market Concentration, supra note 21 (cor-
rected working paper).
63 This simplification does not account for differences in marginal costs and capacities across
firms. (If breakdown of coordination leads to a repeated one-shot Cournot equilibrium, some
firms—namely those with low costs and high capacities—may earn profits, contrary to the as-
sumption made here, and they may, in consequence, find it profitable to deviate from the coordi-
nated outcome for some rates of capacity utilization that would satisfy equation (9).) The model
abstracts from these and other complications to highlight two broad intuitions likely to hold in
general: a merger involving a maverick is likely to raise price, and a maverick may have struc-
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With these assumptions, each firm’s incentive constraint can be specified.
(8) (P−Ci)siQ(P)/(1 − δ) ≥ (P − Ci)ki(1 − δT)/(1 − δ), for i = 1. . . .n
As equation (8) indicates, firm i prefers coordination to cheating if and only if
the present value of the profit stream from continued cooperation equals or
exceeds the present value of the profit stream from cheating. The incentive
constraint is simplified algebraically in equation (9).
(9) si Q(P)/ki ≥ (1 − δT), for i = 1. . . .n
The left-hand expression in equation (9) is the firm’s rate of capacity utiliza-
tion (quantity sold as a fraction of capacity).
Equation (9) illustrates the role of a maverick firm in constraining coordi-
nation. Picture arraying the n firms in terms of their capacity utilization rate,
from highest to lowest. The firm with the lowest rate is the maverick. At a low
enough price, all firms will operate at high enough capacity to satisfy the
inequality. The coordinated price can rise, making coordination more effec-
tive, until one firm, the maverick, becomes indifferent between cooperation
and cheating. The other firms would prefer a higher price, but coordination is
imperfect. The industry price stays below the fully collusive price, constrained
by the maverick.
A merger involving the maverick (firm 1) and a rival (firm 2) relaxes the
constraint that the maverick imposes, as indicated in equation (10).
(10) (s1 + s2)Q(P)/(k1 + k2) ≥ (1 − δT)
Relaxing the constraint will likely lead to a higher price. That price increase
might be small, however, if the firm that steps in as the constraint has a capac-
ity utilization rate close to that of the premerger maverick and thus prefers a
price only slightly higher than the premerger maverick desired.
As the model indicates, a merger involving a maverick is likely to raise
price.64 This intuition provides a plausible basis for a presumption, appropriate
for application to merger review in administrative setttings, that a merger in-
volving a maverick will harm competition.65
tural characteristics suggesting limited benefits to continued cooperation or substantial benefits
from cheating.
64 If one were willing to assume no third firm is waiting in the wings, and the other assump-
tions in the model plausibly applied to an industry setting, the equality in equation (10) could in
principle be employed to simulate the postmerger price. Given the strong assumptions underlying
that equation, however, the formula is better thought of as supporting a more general intuition.
65 The implications of mergers not involving a maverick for the coordinated price are dis-
cussed in Baker, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 182–88. For example, the merger of firms that are
not mavericks can alter the maverick’s incentives or create a new maverick.
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The key to applying such a presumption is to identify the most likely mav-
erick. Equation (9) should not be interpreted as suggesting that capacity utili-
zation is the key to doing so. Rather, the equation depicts each firm as
balancing the benefit from continued cooperation (the numerator) against the
benefits of cheating (the denominator).66 A maverick may thus have structural
characteristics suggesting limited benefits to continued cooperation, such as a
low market share. Or it may have characteristics suggesting substantial bene-
fits from cheating, such as high excess capacity or an unusual ability to ex-
pand output without detection some other way (perhaps by exploiting vertical
integration). A maverick might also be identified through a natural experi-
ment—changes in a maverick’s costs should affect the coordinated price but
changes in a non-maverick’s firm-specific costs should not—or through ob-
serving that price increases proposed by firms do not stick unless the maver-
ick goes along.67
It is not always possible to identify the maverick firm that constrains more
effective coordination, however, even if industry coordination appears likely.
Under such circumstances, maverick thinking may suggest applying instead a
presumption based on concentration. In particular, if there is one maverick in
an industry with n firms, a random merger has a probability 2/n of involving
the maverick. Mergers are not, of course, random events, but given the market
power motive for a merger involving a maverick, it is plausible that the
probability that a proposed merger does so exceeds 2/n, suggesting that in the
absence of other information, a merger from four significant firms68 to three in
a market conducive to coordination is more likely than not to harm competi-
tion by changing the maverick’s incentives. Moreover, if a merger reduces
asymmetry among the firms, the probability that it involves a maverick is
likely higher.69
Here the simple simulation model (10) is not used to generate a prediction
about the postmerger price. Instead, an intuition based on the model justifies a
presumption about adverse coordinated effects when one of the merging firms
is a maverick (or, if the presumption is based upon concentration, when one of
the merging firms is likely a maverick70). The benefits of relying on such a
66 The model and the intuition here assume that cheating firms would deviate from the coordi-
nated outcome by cutting the coordinated price (cheating on the “reward state”), not by declining
to punish cheating rivals (cheating on the “punishment state”).
67 These methods are discussed in Baker, Mavericks, supra note 25, at 173–77.
68 A firm is significant for this purpose if it is large enough to defeat coordination by cheating.
69 Cf. Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction: Pre-Merger Constraints and Post-Merger
Effects, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 65, 72–80 (2003) (narrowing firm asymmetries facilitates
coordination); Olivier Compte, Fre´de´ric Jenny & Patrick Rey, Capacity Constraints, Mergers
and Collusion, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (2002) (same).
70 As the text suggests, in the absence of evidence as to which firm is a maverick, one possi-
bility would be to presume that the merger involves a maverick and thus raises a coordinated
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presumption are similar to those arising from the direct use of a simple simu-
lation: it can be applied rapidly, makes transparent the simple economic logic
on which coordinated effects rests, is readily accessible to decisionmakers,
and provides guidance to them and the merging firms. These are benefits in
the administrative context and do not detract from the value of the ongoing
research effort among academics to develop comprehensive simulation meth-
ods for coordinated effects.
III. SIMULATION IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
Simulation models can be comprehensive or simple. Comprehensive simu-
lations aim at increased precision, limited only by the available information
and considerations of mathematical tractability. Such approaches are appro-
priate in an academic context. They can also be useful in an administrative
context, particularly in settings where precision is a very important considera-
tion: when mergers have been targeted by enforcers for an extensive review
(after a “second request” in the U.S. system) and as a basis for expert testi-
mony in merger litigation.
As a decisionmaking tool for an antitrust enforcement system, comprehen-
sive simulations resemble an unstructured standard for formulating legal rules,
like a comprehensive reasonableness test.71 As with unstructured standards
generally, a comprehensive simulation uses all available information to mini-
mize the likelihood of errors, but in doing so it can raise administrative costs
and limit guidance to firms seeking to comply with the law and judges seek-
ing to understand and enforce it.72
The additional demands of the administrative context for accessibility and
guidance, however, call for greater use of simple simulations. Like bright-line
legal rules, simple simulations use less than all available information, ac-
cepting less precision to reduce administrative costs and improve guidance.73
The previous discussion highlights two possibilities for the use of simple
simulations in merger review: a simple simulation screen for the preliminary
effects concern, if the merger reduces the number of significant firms to three or fewer in a
market conducive to coordination, or reduces the number of significant firms to four or five or
fewer if the merger reduces asymmetry among the rivals.
71 The opposite pole consists of bright-line rules, though many legal rules are hybrids, located
between the poles.
72 Cf. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 24, at 103–06 (Sidebar 2-1) (describing policy considerations
at stake in specifying the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act).
73 Bright-line rules operate by limiting the information that will be considered. They condition
decisions on observable information that is thought to be correlated with what would be learned
were full information available and that is hard to manipulate by parties seeking to appear benign
when they are not. Their benefit comes in reducing administrative costs and providing greater
guidance to firms and judges. Their cost is in increased likelihood of error relative to a decision
based on all information.
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review of unilateral effects, and a presumption based on identifying mavericks
for the analysis of coordinated effects. Screens and presumptions like these—
and potentially these very ones—should be used by enforcement agencies to
identify mergers for in-depth review and to explain the competitive problem
to generalist decisionmakers.74 Moreover, courts should be encouraged to ac-
cept them as the basis for a presumption of anticompetitive effect. Under this
scheme, screens and presumptions would supplement the use of comprehen-
sive simulations. The simple approaches would be used to decide whether
extensive review is appropriate and to explain the competitive issues to gener-
alist decisionmakers, but their implications could be questioned or qualified in
an extensive review through the use of comprehensive simulations. Employ-
ing simple simulation approaches in this way would be analogous to using a
bright-line rule for decisionmaking.
The main disadvantage in employing these approaches is the potential loss
of precision resulting from the adoption of any particular screen or presump-
tion, including the choice of a specific threshold of concern.75 The errors
could go either way, permitting anticompetitive mergers to proceed without
challenge or deterring procompetitive transactions that might be caught by the
screens. But these problems can be limited by relying upon the antitrust agen-
cies to select appropriate simple simulation models and thresholds based on
their experience.
The U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines are a natural place for establishing
the use of presumptions and screens because they describe how the enforce-
ment agencies go about their work and they are relied upon by courts as per-
suasive authority in merger review. Not surprisingly, therefore, the current
Guidelines apply screens and presumptions similar to those advocated here. In
analyzing unilateral effects, the 2010 Guidelines use the GUPPI measure of
diverted sales as an indicator that the merger will create upward pricing pres-
sure.76 The 2010 Guidelines also follow previous guidelines by recognizing
the role of mavericks in constraining coordinated effects and expressing con-
cern about a merger involving a maverick.77
But the U.S. antitrust agencies could do more, in the Guidelines as well as
in speeches, closing statements, and complaints, to make explicit their reli-
74 Cf. Oliver Budzinski, An Institutional Analysis of the Enforcement Problems in Merger
Control 19–22 (May 2010) (recommending the use of economically based rebuttable presump-
tions), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615486.
75 Relatedly, it may be difficult to vary the screen over time if experience or economic studies
show that the thresholds could be set at better levels without appearing to make political choices,
though recent changes in the concentration thresholds in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines do
not appear to have drawn such criticism.
76 Guidelines, supra note 8, § 6.1 & n.11.
77 Id. §§ 2.1.5, 5.3, 7.1.
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ance on these screens and presumptions. Doing so will shape how merging
parties evaluate and present their proposed transactions and ultimately how
non-specialist judges evaluate them in litigation. Improved guidance will ben-
efit the merging parties as well as the courts, agencies, and public.
